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Abstract. Neoclassical growth models predict that reductions in capital or labor
income tax rates are expansionary when lump-sum transfers are used to balance
the government budget. This paper explores the consequences of bond-ﬁnanced
tax reductions that bring forth a range of possible oﬀsetting policies, including
future government consumption, capital tax rates, or labor tax rates. Through
the resulting intertemporal distortions, current tax cuts can be expansionary or
contractionary. The paper also ﬁnds that more aggressive responses of oﬀsetting
policies to debt engender less debt accumulation and less costly tax cuts.
1. Introduction
Can tax cuts pay for themselves? If not, to what extent do tax cuts expand the
tax base to oﬀset revenue losses? These questions are under active consideration by
U.S. ﬁscal authorities who are studying dynamic scoring to assess the budgetary cost
of tax changes. Dynamic scoring computes the revenue eﬀects of a tax proposal using
macroeconomic models in which tax changes can aﬀect aggregate income and feedback
to revenues through the tax base.
1 Recent academic research employs calibrated
neoclassical growth models to bring modern quantitative analysis to bear on the
questions in fully general equilibrium environments [Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006)
and Trabandt and Uhlig (2006)].
This paper pursues two themes that are important for dynamic scoring but are
abstracted from in existing academic work. First, how do the ﬁscal costs of tax
cuts vary with alternative assumptions about ﬁnancing methods: reducing transfers
or purchases, raising other taxes, or increasing borrowing? Second, if tax cuts are
ﬁnanced through borrowing, how do the costs vary with the aggressiveness of the
oﬀsetting ﬁscal reaction to debt growth? The ﬁrst theme ﬁgures prominently in prac-
tical analyses by ﬁscal agencies [Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2005), Joint Committee
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on Taxation (2005), U.S. Department of Treasury (2006)], but tend to be handled
in stark ways in academic studies. The second theme is implicit in ﬁscal agencies’
studies in which debt accumulation is tracked, but overlooked in academic work.
Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) examine dynamic scoring in a neoclassical growth
model, assuming that contemporaneous lump-sum transfers adjust to balance the
budget. A version of the model calibrated to U.S. data suggests that permanent
reductions in capital (labor) tax rates can expand the tax base enough to oﬀset
53 percent (17 percent) of the revenue loss. As the authors themselves point out,
however, their analysis does not address several factors that are potentially impor-
tant for dynamic scoring, including the possibility that ﬁnancing schemes may dis-
tort economic behavior. Trabandt and Uhlig (2006) consider a distorting ﬁnancing
method—reductions in government consumption—but assume that government debt
evolves exogenously; hence, their paper does not study the consequences of perma-
nent or transitory changes in the state of government indebtedness induced by tax
changes.
We analyze a conventional neoclassical growth model that is a discrete-time version
of Mankiw and Weinzierl’s model. Government issues debt to ﬁnance a tax cut, and
has access to lump-sum and distorting ﬁnancing schemes to maintain ﬁscal solvency.
To the extent that a reduction in one ﬁscal distortion is replaced by a change in some
other distortion, or combination of distortions, the results derived from lump-sum
ﬁnancing are likely to change.
2 Speciﬁcally, we consider permanent reductions in cap-
ital or labor tax rates. Fiscal sustainability is ensured by one of three instruments: (1)
lower government transfer-output ratios, (2) lower government consumption-output
ratios, or (3) increases in other tax rates. The budgetary cost of tax cuts is measured
by changes in tax revenues net of interest payments on outstanding debt.
3
The paper studies how permanent cuts in capital and labor tax rates aﬀect the
economy, both in long-run steady states and along the transition path to a new steady
state. Two conclusions emerge. First, the expansionary eﬀects of a tax cut depend
crucially on the choice of which ﬁscal instrument adjusts and on the magnitude of the
adjustment in response to a deteriorating budget. The stronger is the response, the
less debt accumulates, and the more favorable are the expansionary eﬀects of a tax
cut.
4 Second, government indebtedness matters for the budgetary cost of a tax cut
especially in the long(er) run: a more aggressive response to a deteriorating budget
2This point echoes a theme that appears in Baxter and King (1993) and Sims (1998).
3In contrast to Mankiw and Weinzierl, we do not compute revenue feedback measures, which are
deﬁned as the proportion of revenue losses oﬀset by an expanded tax base. When a cut in one tax
rate is oﬀset by an increase in another tax rate, there is no change in the static score—the change
in revenues holding the tax base ﬁxed—and revenue feedback is undeﬁned. In addition, when a tax
cut is debt-ﬁnanced, interest payments should be factored into computing the budgetary impact.
4In a model with monopolistic competition and nominal price rigidity, Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis
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yields a smaller debt-output ratio and makes a tax cut less costly. This result holds
even when the ﬁscal adjustment is non-distorting.
2. Budget Solvency and Tax Cuts
Neoclassical growth models, such as Baxter and King (1993), take the long-run
growth rate of the economy as exogenous and impose the restriction that a debt-
ﬁnanced tax cut inevitably involves some oﬀsetting policies to ensure budget solvency.
Oﬀsetting policies, however, may be unnecessary when long-run growth rates are
endogenous. King and Rebelo (1990) ﬁnd that lower income tax rates produce higher
long-run economic growth. Ireland (1994) further demonstrates that when the long-
run growth rate after a tax cut outpaces the growth rate of government debt, the
expansionary eﬀects of a debt-ﬁnanced tax cut can pay oﬀ debt without any further
ﬁscal adjustments. Subsequent studies by Bruce and Turnovsky (1999) and Novales
and Ruiz (2002), however, ﬁnd that tax cuts can improve the long-run budget only
when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption is implausibly high.
Although some doubt remains about whether a deﬁcit-ﬁnanced tax cut can actually
be self-ﬁnancing, this paper focuses on circumstances in which tax cuts induce current
or future ﬁscal adjustments that maintain a sustainable budget.
In the U.S. economy, state governments quickly initiate oﬀsetting policies because
many state constitutions require balancing the budget within a couple of years. No
analogous statutory requirement constrains federal behavior, and oﬀsetting policy ac-
tions can take much longer to be implemented. For example, when the debt-output
ratio rose rapidly in the early and mid-1980s (partly due to the large tax cuts in the
Economic Recovery Act of 1981), the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings balanced-budget law
was enacted in 1985 to reduce deﬁcits. In addition, the Omnibus Budget Reconcil-
iation Acts of 1990 and 1993, which increased individual and corporate income tax
rates, were passed to reduce government debt. A rapidly rising debt-GDP ratio since
2001 again has spurred calls for cutting federal deﬁcits [Greenspan (2005a,b)].
Aside from anecdotal examples, some econometric evidenceﬁnds that policy makers
systematically take corrective measures in response to rising debt levels. Using long-
term U.S. data from 1916 to 1995, Bohn (1998) concludes that the primary surplus
responds positively to the debt-GDP ratio and makes the debt ratio mean-reverting,
after controlling for war-time spending and for cyclical ﬂuctuations. Davig and Leeper
(2006) estimate a regime-switching rule for tax policy over the post-war period in the
U.S. and ﬁnd that policy swings between periods when taxes are unresponsive to debt
and periods when they respond aggressively. Davig (2005) uses a Markov-switching
consumption to debt is nearly optimal. Their model, however, has a ﬁxed capital stock and distor-
tions not present in the current analysis, so diﬀerences between their ﬁndings and this analysis are
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model to test the global sustainability of U.S. post-war policy; he ﬁnds that threats to
long-run sustainability posed by expanding periods of discounted debt are mitigated
by the expectation of returning to a regime where debt is repaid. This evidence
underscores the empirical relevance of considering postponed oﬀsetting policies to
ensure budget solvency following a tax cut.
Throughout the analysis, we maintain the assumption that private agents are en-
dowed with all the information needed to form rational expectations. Agents know
the rules governing ﬁscal instruments and they anticipate future oﬀsetting policies
during periods of expanding debt. Budget solvency in the model means that the
intertemporal government budget constraint is satisﬁed both ex ante and ex post.
While the debt-output ratio after a tax cut can be permanently higher, debt cannot
permanently grow faster than the economy.
3. The Model
The model economy consists of a representative competitive household, a represen-
tative competitive ﬁrm, and a government.
3.1. The private sector. The household chooses consumption, Ct, capital, Kt,

















subject to the budget constraint












WtLt +( 1− δ)Kt−1 + Bt−1Rt−1 + Tt,
taking all prices and policies as given. Et is the mathematical expectation conditional
on the household’s information set at t. β is the discount factor (0 <β<1). γ and
θ are the inverses of elasticities of intertemporal substitution of consumption and
leisure (γ>0a n dθ ≥ 0). τK
t and τL
t are proportional tax rates levied on capital and
labor income. Tt is lump-sum transfers if positive (taxes if negative). δ is the capital
depreciation rate (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1). Wt is the real wage, ρt is the capital rental rate, and
Rt−1 is the gross real interest rate on government bonds.







 1−α − WtLt − ρtKt−1,
where h is the constant growth rate of labor augmenting technology (h ≥ 1) ,a n dα
is the share of capital in output (0 <α<1). The ﬁrm takes prices parametrically.
Total goods produced each period are Yt = Kα
t−1 (htLt)
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3.2. The government. This paper is a positive analysis of the budgetary conse-
quences of tax cuts which are ﬁnanced in various ways. To study the implications
of alternative ﬁnancing schemes, we posit the simplest possible rules for policy in-
struments that are consistent with ﬁscal solvency. Fiscal instruments are chosen as
a function of the state of government indebtedness, as measured by the debt-output
ratio. The rules adopted here are abstractions designed to capture the practice of
oﬀsetting policy: when the ﬁscal budget deteriorates and debt rises, explicit ﬁscal
actions are taken to improve the budget situation.































































Yt and variables without time subscripts denote steady
state values. The rules build in a one-year delay for the response of an oﬀsetting
policy.5
We refer to the q’s in rules (1)-(4) as the “ﬁscal adjustment parameters.” Sign re-
strictions on qK,q L,q T, and qG are straightforward. When the debt-output ratio rises
above its initial steady-state level, one of the future distorting tax rates is raised, the
government consumption-output is reduced, or the transfers-output ratio is lowered
to maintain ﬁscal solvency. To isolate the impacts of each ﬁnancing instrument, one
of the q’s is nonzero in each experiment. For example, if the transfers-output ratio
is adjusted, qT < 0, qG = qK = qL = 0. The magnitudes of the q’s characterize how
strongly the oﬀsetting policy reacts to debt.
Policy choices must satisfy rules (1)-(4) and the government’s budget constraint at
each date:
Bt = Gt + Rt−1Bt−1 − τ
L
t WtLt − τ
K
t ρtKt−1 + Tt, (5)
where for simplicity we assume all government debt is one-period and indexed for
inﬂation.
5Longer delays can be easily handled. We only present results under one-year delay; the results
under ﬁve-year delay are very similar.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 6
Any equilibrium must satisfy both the ﬁrst-order conditions for the household and
the ﬁrm and the transversality conditions for debt and capital accumulation. For
debt, this condition is Et limT→∞(
β
h)t+Tu (ct+T)Bt+T = 0, which essentially ensures
that in any optimum the household does not overaccumulate government liabilities.
Writing the government’s ﬂow budget constraint, (14), in terms of shares of output,






























In equilibrium, (6) determines the value of government debt. It also imposes re-
strictions on dynamic interactions between current debt and expected future policies.
A debt-ﬁnanced tax cut that raises Bt/Yt requires some combination of ﬁscal variables
and/or discount factors in the future to be expected to adjust. Of course, there are
many expected sequences of ﬁscal policies that satisfy (6). The policy rules (1)-(4)
serve to specify one of many paths of ﬁscal variables. Feasibility is ensured by the
judicious choice of response magnitude parameters—the q’s in the rules.
6 Note that,
as written, (6) holds in realizations. Taking expectations at t and imposing the asset-
pricing relation for government bonds reveals that the value of debt at t depends on
the expected present values of future ﬁscal instruments.
3.3. The solution method. Following King, Plosser, and Rebelo (2002), the model,
which has a deterministic growth trend h, is scaled by the factor of ht. This creates
a new discount factor, β∗ ≡ βh1−γ, such that the steady state of the economy has
constant output growth and constant consumption-output, investment-output, and
debt-output ratios. An analytical solution is not available; the equilibrium conditions
are log-linearized around the steady state growth path and analyzed in terms of
percentage deviations from that growth path. The model is solved using Sims’s
(2001) algorithm.7
3.4. The equilibrium. A competitive rational expectations equilibrium is deﬁned
as the agent’s decisions, {Ct,L t,K t,B t}
∞





t=0, and policy variables, {Bt,G t,τL
t ,τK
t ,T t}, such that, given initial levels
6At the end of the paper, we consider another set of policy rules.
7We examine permanent tax cuts. The use of log-linearization may raise concerns about the
quality of the ﬁrst-order approximation when the equilibrium is away from the original steady state.
Such concerns are alleviated by the facts that the equilibrium system for the model is nearly log-
linear and that the size of tax cuts considered here is fairly small (a reduction of 1 percent of tax
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of capital and debt, K−1 and B−1, the optimality conditions for agents’ and ﬁrms’
problems are satisﬁed in each period; the goods, capital, labor, and bond markets
clear; the transversality conditions for capital and debt hold; and the government
budget constraint and the policy rules (equations (1)-(4)) are satisﬁed. The analysis
focuses on the ranges of the ﬁscal adjustment parameters—the q’s—that are consistent
with the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium.
3.5. Model calibration. The model is calibrated at an annual frequency. Table 1
reports the benchmark values of parameters and steady state values of variables before
a permanent tax rate change. The choices of the values for structural parameters
are comparable to those in similar models with distorting capital and labor income
taxation [Braun (1994), McGrattan (1994), Jones (2002), and Yang (2005)]. The
model implies that in the original steady state, the fraction of time spent working
is 0.20, the consumption-output ratio is 0.63, and the investment-output ratio is
0.17. The debt-output ratio in the steady state before a tax cut is 0.376, roughly
corresponding to the ratio of federal debt held by the public to GDP in 2005 [Table
78, Economic Report of the President (2006)].
Benchmark settings of the q’s are presented in the left column of table 2.8 These
values are chosen so that after a permanent 1 percent reduction in the capital or
labor tax rate, the economy evolves to a new steady state in which the debt-output
ratio is 0.442, the postwar average for the ratio of privately held federal debt to GDP
[1947-2005, Table 78, Economic Report of the President (2006)].
9
4. Dynamic Impacts of Permanent Tax Rate Cuts
This section reports the dynamic impacts of permanent reductions in capital and
labor tax rates and shows how those impacts change when the ﬁnancing schemes vary
among permanently higher lump-sum transfers, a lower government consumption-
output ratio, and increases in other proportional tax rates.
4.1. Tax-rate cuts ﬁnanced by lump-sum transfers. To show that the govern-
ment ﬁnancing rule is an important determinant of the eﬀects of permanent tax cuts,
ﬁrst we examine the consequences of tax rate cuts ﬁnanced by lump-sum transfers.
The policy rule for the transfer-output share, (3), isoperative, so debt-ﬁnanced deﬁcits
reduce expected future transfers. Fiscal adjustment parameters are qT = −0.341 for
a capital tax cut and qT = −0.371 for a labor tax cut (table 2). Figure 1 reports the
8Small values of q imply that following a tax cut, the debt-output ratio grows rapidly and the
new steady state value for sB can be quite distant from its initial steady state value. Of course,
as sB
t−1/sB increases, even small values of q imply large oﬀsetting policy adjustments, which imply
larger contractionary eﬀects.
9Section 5.1 reports the sensitivity of outcomes to variations in the strength of ﬁscal responses.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 8
responses to a capital tax rate cut (solid lines), and to a permanent cut in the labor
tax rate (dashed-dotted lines).
Both tax cuts have strong expansionary eﬀects on output (the tax base), with higher
investment and hours worked along the transition path. In the short run, substitution
eﬀects created by lower tax rates entice agents to invest more and work harder, raising
output. As the economy converges to the new steady state, wealth eﬀects from higher
disposable income begin to dominate, raising consumption and leisure; investmentand
hours worked subside somewhat, but remain above their original steady state levels.
Although Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) ﬁnance the tax-rate reductions with con-
temporaneous lump-sum transfer cuts, rather than debt, Ricardian equivalence en-
sures the two exercises produce identical eﬀects on C, K, L, Y , and the prices. The
qualitative patterns for permanent capital or labor tax cuts are the same in this model
as in Mankiw and Weinzierl’s model. The tax base expands along the transition path
and in the new steady state for either tax cut (ﬁgure 1). Revenues from capital and
labor income taxes are permanently lower (bottom right panel) and the shortfall is
absorbed by permanently lower lump-sum transfers (bottom left panel). Our model
implies 95 percent (47 percent) of the revenue losses associated with a capital (labor)
tax rate cut are oﬀset by an expanded tax base in the long run when transfers ﬁnance
the deﬁcits.10
When the government has access to a non-distorting tax instrument, lower tax
rates appear to be expansionary and tax cuts are self-ﬁnancing to a large degree.
4.2. Alternative ﬁnancing schemes. We turn now to the transitional dynamics
following a permanent reduction in capital (or labor) tax rates, when the tax cuts
are ﬁnanced initially by government debt and eventually by permanent reductions
in government consumption or permanent increases in labor (or capital) tax rates.
Figure 2 plots the dynamic responses of macroeconomic and budgetary variables to a
permanent, unexpected 1 percent cut in the capital tax rate. Dashed-dotted lines are
the impacts with qG = −0.119 and qT = qK = qL = 0; solid lines are the impacts with
10Diﬀerences in revenue feedback between our result and Mankiw and Weinizerl’s stem from
model calibrations. Changing three aspects of our calibration helps to reconcile the diﬀerences: (1)
reducing the original steady state capital tax rate from 0.35 to 0.25; (2) increasing the steady state
time share spent working from 20 to 34 percent; and (3) reducing the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution from 1 to 0.5. Under this alternative calibration, our model implies 67 percent and 25
percent of revenue loss for a capital and labor tax cut is oﬀset by an expanded tax base under lump-
sum transfer ﬁnancing. Reducing the steady state capital tax rate plays the most important role
in moving our results towards Mankiw and Weinzierl’s. The average U.S. capital tax rate between
1947 and 2004 is about 0.39, according to Jones’s (2002) method.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 9
qL =0 .149 and qG = qT = qK = 0; for reference, we repeat part of the responses from
ﬁgure 1, which are dashed lines obtained when qT = −0.341 and qG = qK = qL =0 . 11
When the capital tax rate is permanently cut, it increases the expected rate of
return to investment. Regardless of which policy rule is used, agents sacriﬁce con-
sumption in order to invest more in the ﬁrst few years; consumption initially falls
below the level in the original steady state path. Lower consumption raises the mar-
ginal utility of consumption, raising the beneﬁt of working and the supply of labor.
Higher labor and higher capital stock produce more output.
On the government ﬁnancing side, the capital tax rate cut drives up the government
debt-output ratio. When lump-sum transfers fall with debt, the tax reduction has its
largest positive eﬀects on investment, hours, and output (dashed lines in ﬁgure 2).
This outcome is not surprising, as a distorting source of tax revenues is replaced by
a non-distorting source.
Alternative ﬁnancing schemes, however, involve changing some other distortion,
with important implications for the impacts of tax changes. Reductions in the gov-
ernment consumption-output ratio (dotted-dashed lines) raise wealth as the govern-
ment absorbs a smaller share of output. Wealthier households consume more leisure,
reducing hours worked both along the transition path and in the new steady state.
In the long run, the reduction in the government consumption ratio crowds in private
consumption, raising consumption above its original steady state level. Ultimately, a
higher after-tax return on investment raises the steady state capital stock and output,
though by less than when lump-sum transfers adjust to clear the government budget.
When the labor income tax rate (solid lines) rises to compensate for the lower
capital tax rate, the permanently lower after-tax return to labor reduces hours worked
in the new steady state. After rising initially, output declines to about 0.2 percent
below its original steady state level. This negative outcome on the long-run tax base
is strikingly diﬀerent from the case when lump-sum transfers are used to respond
to higher debt. Permanently higher investment, coupled with a ﬁxed government
consumption-output ratio, implies that consumption is lower in the new steady state.
Total revenues derived from capital and labor income taxes are permanently lower
when government consumption or lump-sum transfers adjust, while revenuesrise when
labor tax rates adjust. Because permanently higher revenues after a capital tax cut
arise from higher future labor tax rates, it would be misleading to infer that capital
tax cuts per se generate permanently higher revenues.
To measure the budgetary cost of a tax cut, we also compute revenues net of
interest payment (net revenues) to service debt. Regardless of which policy rule is
11We do not allow a tax rate to adjust in response to its own shock so that the tax rate being
shocked can be permanently held at 1 percent below its original steady state level.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 10
used, interest payments rise and net revenues fall steadily as the debt-output ratio
gradually climbs to a permanent higher level (bottom panels of the ﬁgure). Although
a capital tax cut ﬁnanced by a labor tax rate increase generates more revenues, net
revenues still fall as the increased tax revenues are insuﬃcient to compensate for the
additional interest payment due to the debt-ﬁnanced tax cut.
Analogous, but diﬀerent, patterns of results emerge when a permanent labor tax
rate reduction is ﬁnanced by three alternative schemes. Figure 3 reports responses to
a 1 percent labor tax rate cut. Dashed-dotted lines are the impacts with qG = −0.130
and qT = qK = qL = 0; solid lines give the responses when capital taxes adjust with
qK =0 .206 and qT = qG = qL = 0; dashed lines report eﬀects under qT = −0.371 and
qG = qK = qL =0 .
Once again, the tax impacts on investment, hours worked, and output are largest
when lump-sum transfers respond to debt to satisfy the government budget constraint.
Permanently lower labor tax rates raise the return to labor and increase equilibrium
hours and output for the ﬁrst few years. The deﬁcit-ﬁnanced tax cut raises debt as a
share of output.
When future government consumption is reduced in response to the rising debt, the
positive wealth eﬀect oﬀsets the substitution eﬀect induced by a higher after-tax real
wage and, within 18 years of the tax cut, hours worked fall as the economy converges
to a new steady state with lower employment and output. As before, the reduced
steady state government share crowds in private consumption.
If higher debt raises expected capital taxes, the long-run negative output eﬀects
are still more pronounced; output falls about 1 percent below the original steady
state level in the new steady state. Lower expected returns to investment sharply
reduce investment,output, and consumption.
12 After an initial increase, hours worked
rapidly fall below their original steady state level. When capital taxes are expected
to adjust to balance the budget, a permanent cut in labor taxes produces only an
ephemeral expansionary eﬀect; in the long run, the tax base falls.
Like a capital tax cut, net revenues fall under all ﬁnancing schemes for a debt-
ﬁnanced labor tax cut. The diﬀerences in net revenues are quite small among the
three ﬁnancing schemes despite some diﬀerences in revenues and the interest rate. As
the three ﬁnancing schemes yield nearly identical paths for the debt-output ratio, it
is clear that government indebtedness is important in determining the budgetary cost
of a tax cut.
Mankiw and Weinizerl show that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of
leisureplays an important role in determiningrevenuefeedback numbers. We consider
two alternative settings for this parameter—θ =2a n dθ = 5—implying the smaller
12Similar results appear in Gordon and Leeper’s (2005) study of countercyclical ﬁscal policies.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 11
elasticities of 0.5 and 0.2. While the responses of key macroeconomic variables to
either tax rate shock vary somewhat, the qualitative patterns are the same as those
under the benchmark values. Importantly, the paper’s message—that the ultimate
source of ﬁscal ﬁnancing matters to conclusions about dynamic scoring—is unaltered
by diﬀerent assumptions about labor elasticity.
Fiscal adjustments operating through diﬀerent ﬁnancing instruments (government
consumption or one of the two distorting income taxes) can generate permanent
changes in important macroeconomic variables. In particular, the expansionary eﬀects
of a tax cut can be reversed in the longer run. Moreover, even if a tax cut raises the
tax base and total revenues, it may reduce revenues net of interest payments on the
debt. This result is an outgrowth of the permanent increase in the debt-output ratio
induced by the permanent tax cuts.
5. Changes in Government Indebtedness and the Impacts of Tax Cuts
The above analysis focuses on the consequences of varying which ﬁscal instrument
adjusts to maintain budget solvency. In this section, we focus on how changes in
government indebtedness aﬀect the expansionary eﬀects and the budgetary costs of
tax cuts.
5.1. Transition dynamics under two long-run debt-output ratios. Figure 4
compares the tax base, net revenues, and debt-output ratios under two sets of settings
of the ﬁscal adjustment parameters for a permanent 1 percent reduction in the capital
tax rate.13 The oﬀsetting policy used to maintain ﬁscal solvency is labeled at the
bottom of each column. The ﬁrst set of q’s yields a long-run debt-output ratio of
0.442, as in the earlier analysis. The second set of q’s are selected such that the long-
run debt-output ratio rises to 1 (the approximate upper bound for the ratio of federal
debt to GDP in postwar U.S. data). Values of the q’s are presented in table 2. Notice
that higher long-run debt-output ratios are associated with smaller magnitudes of
ﬁscal adjustment parameters.
Several observations emerge from the ﬁgure. First, less debt is accumulated along
a transition path and in the ﬁnal steady state when the response magnitude of a
ﬁscal adjustment parameter is relatively large (dotted-dashed lines). Second, more
positive expansionary or less contractionary eﬀects are associated with a smaller long-
run debt-output ratio (except, of course, when transfers adjust). For example, when
government consumption adjusts in response to a capital tax rate cut, the tax base
in the new steady state falls only slightly when qG = −0.119. With qG = −0.086,
in contrast, the tax cut produces stronger negative eﬀects on the tax base (column 2
of ﬁgure 4). When labor taxes adjust in response to a capital tax rate cut (column
13A very similar picture emerges when labor taxes are permanently reduced.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 12
3), although the long-run expansionary eﬀect is negative under both qL’s examined,
the larger the qL, the smaller the reduction in the tax base. Finally, tax cuts are
less expensive (net revenues fall less) when they are associated with smaller long-run
debt-output ratios. This holds even when lump-sum transfers adjust (column 1 of
the ﬁgure).
5.2. Steady state analysis. Figure 4 suggests that how aggressively ﬁscal instru-
ments adjust after a permanent tax cut, with the inevitable consequences for debt
accumulation, matters for the ﬁscal costs of the tax reductions. We probe this phe-
nomenon more deeply by turning to a steady state analysis in which the debt-output
ratio is permitted to vary continuously from 0.376—its 2005 level—to 1.0—near its
postwar peak.
A change in the steady state is triggered by a permanent 1 percent reduction in
either the capital or the labor tax rate. Associated with the new tax rate are steady
state values of endogenous variables, indexed by the new steady state value of the
debt-output ratio. Let Δx denote the change in x across the two steady states. The
government budget constraint in the two steady states implies a restriction among





T − (1 − α)Δτ
L − αΔτ
K, (7)
where in one set of experiments ΔτK = .0035 and in the other set ΔτL = .0025. It is
straightforward to use (7) to compute the adjustment required in other instruments
as a function of the posited change in debt, ΔsB.
Given the steady state values of policy variables, (sT,s G,τK,τL), equilibrium con-


























where variables in lower cases are those scaled by the growth factor ht.
Figure 5 summarizes the relationship between the debt-output ratio and various
budgetary variables for three distorting ﬁscal adjustments under the benchmark pa-
rameter values in table 1. The x-axis in each of the nine plots has debt-output ratios
14Analytical results for a steady state are obtainable but do not lend themselves to intuitive
interpretations for our analysis. Steady state analytics are reported in appendices A and B.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 13
in the new steady state varying from 0.376 to 1. The oﬀsetting policy used is labeled
on the top of each column. The ﬁrst row of the ﬁgure reports magnitudes of ﬁscal
instruments in levels in the new steady state. The second and last rows plot percent
changes in the tax base and net revenues relative to their levels in a steady state
without a tax cut. Solid lines are the eﬀects of a capital tax cut, and the dotted-
dashed lines are the eﬀects of a labor tax cut. The vertical gray lines correspond to
the debt-output ratio 0.442, as analyzed in section 4.
The message is clear: across the three distorting ﬁnancing schemes, a higher debt-
output ratio is associated with (1) larger required ﬁscal adjustments, (2) less favorable
expansionary eﬀects, and (3) more costly tax cuts. Since a higher debt-output ratio
means that a larger share of government resources is devoted to debt service, either
government consumption or transfers have to be permanently lower, or one of the
two tax rates has to be permanently higher to sustain a higher debt-output ratio. As
analyzed in section 4, reductions in government consumption or increases in a capital
or labor tax rate have contractionary eﬀects, oﬀsetting the impacts of the tax rate
cuts; with larger ﬁscal adjustments, contractionary eﬀects are more likely. Finally,
if the tax base falls, declines in net revenues are exacerbated by the higher interest
payments associated with higher long-run debt-output ratios.
Combining the analyses of transition paths and steady states, we ﬁnd that the
systematic relationship between the response magnitude of ﬁscal adjustments to debt
and long-run expansionary outcomes have important policy implications. While tax
policy can be expansionary, debt management policy also matters. A relatively small
response in the short run when the budget starts to deteriorate can be more costly
in the long run.
6. Sensitivity Analysis
Transitional dynamics have been analyzed under simple assumptions about policy
rules. These rules serve as a tool for tracking the transition path and quantifying
the aggressiveness of ﬁscal adjustments to debt. The qualitative conclusions obtained
under these rules about the relationships among the aggressiveness of debt manage-
ment policy, government indebtedness, and the expansionary eﬀects and budget cost
of a tax cut, however, are not sensitive to the particular policy rule, as long as the
rule delivers a sustainable budget.
We check the sensitivity of the transitional dynamics to the speciﬁcation of policy
rules by considering a diﬀerent set of rules, similar to the ones adopted in Trabandt
and Uhlig (2006). In their setup, debt accumulates at the exogenously given long-run
growth rate of the economy, h. One of the ﬁscal instruments adjusts endogenously toDYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 14
ensure the budget constraint is satisﬁed each period.15 Figures 6 and 7 contain the
transitional dynamics and the steady state after a 1 percent permanent reduction in
capital and labor tax rates under the parameters in table 1.
With a constant debt growth rule, while the debt-output ratio can deviate from
the pre-tax cut level each period, the magnitude of the deviation is small because
relatively strong ﬁscal adjustment is triggered at the time of a permanent tax cut. As
a result, the expansionary eﬀects of either tax cut are more favorable and the ﬁscal
cost of the tax cuts are smaller, compared to the delayed ﬁscal adjustments examined
in section 4.
For example, under a delayed labor tax rate adjustment, the tax base eventually
falls below the original steady state level for a capital tax rate cut (ﬁgure 2) but
stays positive under the constant debt growth rule (ﬁgure 6). Because the debt rule
keeps the debt-output ratio much smaller throughout the horizon, the labor tax rate
rises only slightly to maintain budget solvency. Unlike the case of the delayed ﬁscal
adjustments, the expansionary eﬀects from the permanent capital tax rate cut are
never outweighed by the contractionary eﬀects of the increase in the labor tax rate.
Similar comparative results are found for the labor tax rate cut. When the capital tax
rate adjusts, the tax base falls 0.3 percent below the path without a tax cut (ﬁgure
7), much smaller than the same experiment under the earlier policy rule—1 percent
(ﬁgure 3).
When debt grows exogenously, it cannot change with either tax cut. However,
interest payments rise in most cases because of the higher interest rate, except for
the labor tax rate cut under capital tax adjustments (the bottom left panel in ﬁgure
3). As the capital tax rate rises to balance the budget, agents substitute away from
capital into bonds; the interest rate must fall to clear the bond market.
Comparing net revenues in ﬁgures 2 and 6, we see that the ﬁscal costs of same-sized
capital tax rate cuts can be substantially diﬀerent: when government pursues a more
aggressive debt management policy by making debt growth exogenous, the tax cut is
much less costly. In the case of a capital tax rate cut ﬁnanced by higher labor tax
rates, net revenues are even slightly above the path without a tax cut in the long run.
This is because there are few additional interest payments to oﬀset the revenue gains
from the higher labor tax rates.
The results obtained under the constant debt growth rule further highlight our
previous conclusion under the earlier policy rule: when debt is well managed, a tax
cut is more likely to be expansionary, making it less costly both along a transition
path and in the long run.
15Trabandt and Uhlig (2006) only consider the rule where government consumption adjusts to
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Finally, the model assumes that government expenditures do not yield utility or
enter the production function. Although not an uncommon assumption, it is hard to
argue that government expenditure is completely wasteful, as it is in the model. If
government expenditures are productive (such as useful government investment) then
balancing the budget by cutting expenditures can make a tax cut more contractionary
because less capital is available for production. If government expenditure enters the
utility function as a (partial) substitute to private consumption, then reductions in
government expenditures increase private consumption, which has a negative impact
on saving, leading to less capital accumulation and output growth. On the other hand,
ifgovernmentexpendituresenterthe utilityfunction as a complement,then reductions
in government expenditures may increase investment, which in turn mitigates the
contractionary eﬀects resulting from a decrease in government expenditures. The
precise role that government spending plays in the macro economy remains an open
question with important implications for the budgetary costs of tax reductions.
7. Concluding Remarks
Dynamic scoring is a complex business. This paper has maintained the assump-
tion that the true model of the economy, including parameter values, is known with
certainty. Despite that heroic assumption, the model predicts a wide range of expan-
sionary eﬀects and revenue consequences from permanent cuts in tax rates. Those
consequences depend on two critical aspects of ﬁscal behavior: which ﬁscal instru-
ments agents expect will adjust to any revenue shortfalls and the extent to which
shortfalls are ﬁnanced with new debt issuances.
Previous work has made simplifying assumptions about these two aspects of ﬁscal
policy to conclude that permanent tax cuts may, to a large extent, be self-ﬁnancing.
This paper points out, in contrast, that the range of possible dynamic scoring results
mirrors the broad range of ﬁnancing options actually available to policymakers.
As long as ﬁscal authorities are not committed—or cannot commit—to speciﬁc
ﬁnancing schemes, the response of private agents to tax cuts will be conditioned on
expectations of the full range of possible schemes. The analysis in this paper argues
that a complete assessment of the revenue costs of tax changes produces a matrix of
predicted consequences. Rows of the matrix represent the oﬀsetting ﬁscal instruments
and columns represent alternative changes in steady state debt levels. Analyses that
include the two dimensions of the matrix can help inform policy choices.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 16
Appendix: Steady State Analytics
This appendix describes the steady state analytics. We begin with a general analy-
sis that reveals the mechanisms through which government indebtedness matters for
the expansionary eﬀects and the budgetary costs of tax cuts. Then we derive the
analytical solution under the benchmark parameterization, which is used to produce
the (numerical) results presented in section 5 of the paper.
Appendix A. General Analysis




γ − (1 − δ)=( 1− τ
K)Fk(k,L) (11)
v
 (1 − L)=u
 (c)(1 − τ
L)FL(k,L) (12)
c + δ
∗k =( 1− s
G)F(k,L) (13)
where v  is the marginal utility of leisure, u  is the marginal utility of consumption
(consumption and leisure are assumed to enter utility separably), F is the production
function, FX is the marginal product of input X, and δ∗ = h − 1+δ. In (11)-(13)
and in what follows, lower case letters refer to variables on the steady state growth
path; these are upper case variables scaled by the exogenous growth factor, h.T h e
government budget constraint is given by
Bt = Gt + Rt−1Bt−1 − τ
L
t WtLt − τ
K
t ρtKt−1 + Tt (14)
Rewriting the government budget constraint in terms of shares of output and sub-






T − (1 − α)dτ
L − αdτ
K. (15)
Givensteady state settings of policy, (τK,τL,s G,s T), steady state values of (c,k,L,sB)
satisfy (11)-(13) and (15).
In this appendix we examine how changes in steady state policy variables that are
consistent with ﬁscal solvency—that is, satisfy (15)—alter the steady state levels of
variables in the economy.
Given that F(·) is constant returns to scale, we can re-express the system in terms
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y ≡ F(k,L)=Lf(z) (18)





Note that the Euler equation for capital, (11), can be written entirely in terms of
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Totally diﬀerentiating (21) and simplifying
dz =
f (z)
(1 − τK)f  (z)
dτ
K. (22)
Expression (22) reports that the capital-labor ratio changes if and only if the the
capital income tax rate changes.























Rewrite (12) in terms of z
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where
1
θ = −v /[v  (1 − L)] is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of leisure.
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∗]dz. (28)
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γ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of




∂sG > 0. (30)
Let nr denote net revenues, deﬁned as
nr =[ ατ
K +( 1− α)τ
L]Lf(z) − (r − 1)b, (31)
so that
d(nr)=[ ατ




K +( 1− α)dτ




























Use the restrictions from the government budget constraint in (34) in the expression
for d(nr) in (32) to obtain
d(nr)=[ ατ
K +( 1− α)τ













K +( 1− α)dτ
L], (35)
where we use the facts that the tax base is
y = Lf(z) (36)DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 19
and
dy = f(z)dL + Lf
 (z)dz. (37)
We now have four equations—(22), (29), (35) and (37)—in the four total derivatives
dz,dL,d(nr), and dy, which can be expressed in terms only of changes in ﬁscal policy
variables. Our interest is to trace out how government indebtedness aﬀects the tax
base and net revenues in the long run. We ﬁrst use (15) to obtain how a change in the
debt-output ratio aﬀects the magnitudes of adjustment in an oﬀsetting policy. Then
expressions (22), (29), (35), and (37) imply how an adjustment in the oﬀsetting policy
inﬂuences the tax base and net revenues in the new steady state. Three examples
illustrate the mechanisms at work.
In the ﬁrst example, the labor income tax rate is permanently cut and govern-
ment transfers adjust to maintain budget solvency. This corresponds to the ﬁnancing
scheme employed by Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006).
16 After setting dsG = dτK =0 ,
(15) reduces to
ds
T =( 1− β
−1)ds




∂sB =1−β−1 < 0, which says a higher debt-output ratio requires a bigger
reduction in the transfers-output ratio. Note that dsT does not show up in (22), (29),
and (37) but it does appear in (35). Since transfers are non-distorting, they do not
aﬀect steady state labor, capital, and hence the tax base. However, a transfer change
has an eﬀect on net revenues. (35) shows that ∂nr
∂sT = r−1
β−1−1 > 0, which says that
the smaller is the transfers-output ratio, the smaller are net revenues. Combining
with the earlier result that
∂sT
∂sB < 0, we ﬁnd that with a non-distorting ﬁnancing
instrument a higher debt-output ratio has no impact on the tax base but leads to a
more costly tax cut, as implied by the the ﬁrst column of ﬁgure 4.
In the second example, the labor income tax rate is permanently cut and govern-

































16To be more precise, Mankiw and Weinzierl also assume dsB =0 , though this assumption is
irrelevant for the tax base once it is assumed that transfers are the only policy that adjusts.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 20
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Equation (38) implies that the higher is the debt-output ratio, the bigger is the
reduction in the government-consumption output ratio required to maintain budget
solvency. Because
∂y
∂sG > 0a n d ∂nr
∂sG > 0, a smaller government-consumption output
ratio makes the tax base and net revenues fall still more. This result appears in the
dashed lines in the ﬁrst column of ﬁgure 5 in the paper.
The third example permanently cuts the capital income tax rate and government










































K +( 1− α)τ



















Δ + Lf (z)
  













17Given the parameter values, even if sB = 1, the upperbound of debt-output ratio we consider
in the paper, ατK +( 1− α)τL − (r − 1)sB > 0.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 21
∂sG
∂sB < 0 indicates that a higher debt-output ratio requires further reductions in the
government consumption-output ratio.
∂y
∂sG > 0a n d
∂nr
∂sG > 0 imply that the smaller
is the government consumption-output, the less expansionary and more costly is the
capital tax cut (as suggested by the solid line in the ﬁrst column of ﬁgure 5).
Appendix B. Solution for the Benchmark Parameterization
In the benchmark parameterization, we use logarithmic preferencesfor consumption




= α(1 − τ
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Equations (50), (51), and (52) express L, c,a n dk in terms of exogenous parameters
and policy variables. Therefore, the tax base and net revenues can also be expressed
in terms of exogenous parameters and policy variables only.
The analysis begins with an exogenous debt-output ratio in a new steady state.
For a given sB, if the capital income tax rate is permanently reduced by 1 percent










T +( 1− α)τ
L + ατ
K, (53)
where τK is set at 1 percent below its initial steady state level, and sT and τL are set
at their initial steady state values.
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where z and L are deﬁned as in (49) and (50). The analytical results for other
experiments can be derived analogously by the above steps.
Although (54) and (55) are the analytical solutions to the questions of interest,
they are not terribly eﬀective at illuminating the relationships between government
indebtedness and the tax base or the cost of a tax cut. As a consequence, the paper
presents numerical results, such as those summarized in ﬁgure 5.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 24
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parameter value parameter value parameter value
α 0.36 δ 0.1 sT 0.07
β 0.96 h 1.02 τK 0.35
γ 1 χ 3 τL 0.25
θ 1 sG 0.2 sB 0.376
Table 1. Benchmark parameter settings.
long-run sB 0.442 (benchmark) 1
tax shock ΔτK = −1% ΔτL = −1% ΔτK = −1% ΔτL = −1%
qG -0.119 -0.130 -0.086 -0.088
qT -0.341 -0.371 -0.246 -0.251
qL 0.149 - - 0.108 - -
qK - - 0.206 - - 0.140
Table 2. Fiscal adjustment parameters under various policy rules.
The q’s are chosen to allow the debt-output ratio to rise from an initial
level of 0.376 to a new long-run level of 0.442 (second column) or 1.0
(third column).DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 27

































Figure 1. Lump-sum Financing. Impulse responses to a perma-
nent 1% capital or labor tax rate reduction when lump-sum transfers
adjust to balance the budget (in percent). The surprise tax cut occurs
at period 0. Responses are plotted over a 100-year horizon when the
economy has approximately reached its new steady state path.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 28














































Figure 2. Capital Taxes: Alternative Financing Schemes. Re-
sponses to a permanent 1% capital tax rate reduction (in percent).
The surprise tax cut occurs at period 0. Responses are plotted over a
100-year horizon when the economy has approximately reached its new
steady state path. Government consumption adjusts: dotted-dashed
line; labor tax rates adjust: solid line; lump-sum transfers adjust:
dashed line.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 29













































Figure 3. Labor Taxes: Alternative Financing Schemes. Re-
sponses to a permanent 1% labor tax rate reduction. The surprise tax
cut occurs at period 0. Responses are plotted over a 100-year hori-
zon when the economy has approximately reached its new steady state
path. Government consumption adjusts: dotted-dashed line; capital


























































Figure 4. Government Indebtedness and Fiscal Adjustments:
Permanent 1% Capital Tax Rate Reduction. Responses plotted
over a 1000-year horizon. Solid line allows long-run debt-output ratio
to rise to 1.0; dotted-dashed line allows ratio to rise to 0.442. First
column—transfers adjust: dotted-dashed (qT = −.341), solid (qT =
−.246). Second column—government consumption adjusts: dotted-
dashed (qG = −.119), solid (qG = −.086). Third column—labor taxes








































































Figure 5. Steady State Analysis. Solid lines–a permanent 1% cap-
ital tax rate cut; dotted-dashed lines–a permanent 1% labor tax rate
cut. First column–government consumption adjusts; second column–
labor tax rate adjusts; third column–capital tax rate adjusts. Fiscal
instruments are in levels; tax base and net revenues are percent changes
relative to pre-tax cut steady state levels.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 32












































Figure 6. Exogenous debt growth rule. Responses to a perma-
nent 1% capital tax rate reduction (in percent). The surprise tax cut
occurs at period 0. Reponses plotted over a 40-year horizon. Gov-
ernment consumption adjusts in dotted-dashed lines; labor tax rates
adjust in solid lines; lump-sum transfers adjust in dashed lines.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 33













































Figure 7. Exogenous debt growth rule. Responses to a perma-
nent 1% labor tax rate reduction (in percent). The surprise tax cut
occurs at period 0. Reponses plotted over a 40-year horizon. Gov-
ernment consumption adjusts in dotted-dashed lines; capital tax rates
adjust in solid lines; lump-sum transfers adjust in dashed lines.